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11 Introduction
In this paper I revisit the monopolistic screening model of Mussa and
Rosen (1978). Screening models ﬁrst attracted researches in the middle of
the seventies. The pioneering paper in the area is Mirrlees (1971). It uses a
monopolistic screening model to study the question of the optimal taxation
in presence of private information on the side of the taxpayers.
In the following years monopolistic screening models found numerous ap-
plications in economics. For examples, see the papers by Adams and Yellen
(1976), Mussa and Rosen (1978), Mirman and Sibley (1980), Baron and
Myerson (1982), Sappington (1983), Maskin and Riley (1984), and Laﬀont,
Maskin, Rochet (1987), among others.
These papers could be diﬀerentiated on two dimensions: the economic
application they consider and the way they capture the private information.
Private information was captured in the literature in three diﬀerent ways:
assuming a discrete set of types (e.g. Adams and Yellen, 1976), a unidi-
mensional continuum of types (the majority of the papers in the literature),
and a multi-dimensional continuum of types (e. g. Laﬀont, Maskin, Rochet,
1987). The reader is referred to Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995) for
a textbook treatment of the model with a discrete type space, Fudenberg and
2Tirole (1992) for a treatment of the model with a unidimensional continuum
of types, and to Basov (2005) for an up-to-date description of the mathemat-
ical techniques, the main economic results, and the literature review of the
multi-dimensional models.
In this paper I consider a model with a unidimensional continuum of
types. For the concreteness of the exposition I concentrate on the case when a
monopolist produces an indivisible good of diﬀerent qualities. The consumers
are interested in buying at most one unit of the good and have diﬀerent tastes
for the quality, which is their private information.
A common feature of all models with a continuum of types is that the
type space is assumed to be connected. From the economic point of view
this assumption implies that though tastes are heterogenous, the consumers
cannot be divided into diﬀerent distinct groups. In this paper I, on the
contrary, assume that the consumers can be divided into two distinct groups,
for example, high income and low income consumers. The marginal rate of
substitution between quality and money for the representatives of the groups
is always higher than for the representatives of the other. However, there
is some taste heterogeneity within each group. Formally, this is modelled
by assuming that the type space is a union of two disconnected segments.
3Generalization for more than two groups is straightforward.
The ﬁr s tm a i nr e s u l to ft h ep a p e ri s :
(R1) The optimal product line is connected provided that the taste gap
between two groups is suﬃciently small.
The result implies that if the groups are not suﬃciently diﬀerentiated then
if the monopolist oﬀers two qualities in the equilibrium, she will also oﬀer all
the intermediate qualities. This result generalizes one of the most celebrated
results in the models with connected type space: the connectedness of the
product line. For those models it is a direct consequence of the continuity of
the allocation as a function of the type. In the unidimensional the continuity
of allocation was ﬁrst proven by Mussa and Rosen (1978). The statement of
the result in the multidimensional case can be found in Rochet and Chone
(1998). For a proof in this case, see Carlier and Lachand-Robert (2001).
T h em a i nd r i v i n gf o r c eb e h i n dt h eﬁrst result is the second order imple-
mentability condition, which states that to be implementable the allocation
of quality should be weakly increasing. To understand the intuition, imagine
that the type space is a union of two non-intersecting segments. If there
is a quality gap then the consumers on the two segments of the type space
should be served independently of each other. This implies that the con-
4sumers on the right end of the left segment are served eﬃciently, while the
allocation on the left end of the right segment is downward biased. For a
suﬃciently small gap between the segments, this will contradict the second
order implementability constraint.
The second main result investigates the behavior and the regularity prop-
erties of the optimal tariﬀ. I impose enough regularity on the data of the
problem to rule out the need for the ironing procedure of Mussa and Rosen
(1978). I also assume that the cost of production and the density of types
are suﬃciently well behaved. Under these conditions for a connected type
space the optimal tariﬀ will be continuously diﬀerentiable. If the types space
is disconnected, however, the following result holds:
(R2) L e tt h et y p es p a c eb ed i s c o n n e c t e d ,w h i l et h eo p t i m a lp r o d u c tl i n eb e
connected. Then the optimal tariﬀ has n−1 kinks, where n is the number of
the components of the type space.
The above results can be used to study the inverse screening problem,
i. e. the problem of restoring the types distribution from the observed
tariﬀ and product line. Solving the inverse screening model is important
for evaluating the deadweight loss generated by the existence of the private
information, which could be vital for a decision whether the monopoly (e. g.
5an electricity or gas company) should be regulated. The third main result of
the paper is:
(R3) Assume that the optimal tariﬀ has a kink. Then the inverse screening
problem is ill-deﬁned.
As we will see below, if the optimal tariﬀ has a kink not only it is im-
possible to ﬁnd the unique types distribution that generates the given tariﬀ,
it is even impossible to restore the types space. To understand the reason
for this note that at the kink point the subdiﬀerential of the tariﬀ is not
single-valued. Therefore, the allocation is not invertible, i. e. a convex set
of types will opt for the same quality. One cannot, however, infer uniquely
the distribution of types over this convex set, or even whether there are any
consumers whose types fall within it. We will see below that assuming that
the type space connected when in fact it is not can lead to a serious overes-
timation of the fraction of the low types and, as a result, of the welfare costs
of imperfect information.
It is worth noting that the lack of diﬀerentiability of the tariﬀ is a neces-
sary and suﬃcient condition for the inverse screening problem to be essen-
tially ill-deﬁned. Indeed, if the tariﬀ is continuously diﬀerentiable the reader
can easily convince herself that it is possible to determine uniquely the set
6of the consumers who are served at equilibrium and the distribution of types
o v e rt h ep a r t i c i p a t i o nr e g i o n .I ti sa l s op o s s i b l et od e t e r m i n et h em e a s u r eo f
the exclusion region. Though the exact distribution of the consumers over the
exclusion region cannot be found, it will not aﬀect any variables of economic
interest (e. g. the monopolist’s proﬁts or the dead-weight losses). Therefore,
I will say that in this case the inverse screening problem is essentially well
deﬁned.
The paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 introduces the
general model. In Section 3 I solve some numerical examples. Section 4
discusses the inverse screening problem. Section 5 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
Consider a continuum of consumers each of whom is interested in buying
a tm o s to n eu n i to fa ni n d i v i s i b l eg o o d . D i ﬀerent units of the good may,
however, diﬀer in quality, x. The marginal rate of substitution between
quality and money, α, does not depend on quality but diﬀers across the
consumers, i. e. the utility has a form
u(α,x,t)=αx − t, (1)
7where t is the amount paid to the monopolist. I assume that α is private
information of the consumer. However, it is common knowledge that α is
distributed on Ω =[ 0 ,a]∪[b,d] according to a density f(·). We assume that





and assume that it is strictly increasing in α. This assumption will allow us
to reduce the second order implementability condition that requires x(·) to
be non-decreasing (see, Mussa and Rosen,1978) to a requirement
x(b) ≥ x(a).( 3 )
I also assume that
v(a) ≥ 0, (4)
otherwise all types on [0,a] should be excluded from the contract and the
problem reduces to the standard Mussa and Rosen (1978) problem. It will





It is straightforward to check that if v(·) increases in α, so does e v(·).
The utility of the outside option is the same across the consumers and
is normalized to be zero. The cost of production is convex in quality and
additive in quantity and is given by a twice diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing,
convex function c(x). I assume that
c(0) = c
0(0) = 0. (6)
The above consideration can be summarized by the following model. The





(t(x(α)) − c(x(α)))f(α)dα, (7)
9subject to
x(α) ∈ argmax(u(α,x) − t(x)) (8)
max(u(α,x) − t(x)) ≥ 0. (9)
The ﬁrst of these constraints is known as the incentive compatibility con-
straint and states that for any tariﬀ the consumers make the optimal choice,
while the second is the individual rationality constraint, which states that
consumers obtain at least as much utility from the purchase of the monopo-
list’s product as they will from the outside option.
Deﬁne the consumer’s surplus by:
s(α)=m a x ( u(α,x) − t(x)). (10)




for almost all α ∈ (0,a)∪(b,d).1 Moreover, the second order implementability
1One should invoke the general formulation of the envelope theorem by Milgrom and
Segal, since the optimal tariﬀ may fail to be diﬀerentiable.
10constraint can be expressed by requiring that s(·) is convex. Let us deﬁne










0(a),s (b) ≥ (b − a)s
0(a)+s(a) (13)
D e r i v a t i v e si nt h ee n dp o i n t sa r ed e ﬁned by:
s







The ﬁrst constraint here is the participation constraint. Condition (11),
already embodied into the objective (12), is the ﬁrst order incentive compat-
ibility constraint between types α and α − dα, the third of the constraints
(13) is the incentive compatibility constraint between types b and a,a n dt h e
second of the constraints (13) is the consequence of the fact that any im-
plementable allocation is weakly increasing. Our next objective is to solve
problem (12)-(13) and demonstrate that its solution is convex, i. e. it is in
fact the solution to the complete problem.













−F(a)s(0) − s(b)(1 − F(b)) (15)
s.t.s(0) ≥ 0,s
0(b) ≥ s
0(a),s (b) ≥ (b − a)s
0(a)+s(a). (16)
Note that the surplus function enters into the monopolist’s objective only










s.t. s0(b) ≥ s0(a).
(17)
The solution to this problem is deﬁn e du pt of u n c t i o n ,w h i c hi sp i e c e w i s e
constant on [0,a] and [b,d]. The monopolist should then choose the constants
to ensure that s(0) = 0 and s(b)=( b − a)s0(a)+s(a).T h e ﬁrst order
12conditions for this problem are:
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
∂
∂α(e v(α) − c0(s0(α))f(α)) = 0 for α ∈ (0,a)
∂
∂α(v(α) − c0(s0(α))f(α)) = 0 for α ∈ (b,d)
d = c0(s0(d))
a − c0(s0(a)) = λ
λ ≥ 0,s 0(b) ≥ s0(a),λ (s0(b) − s0(a)) = 0.
(18)
The ﬁrst two equations are Euler equations, the third is the usual “no dis-
tortion at the top” condition. To understand the last two conditions, note
that if the constraint s0(b) ≥ s0(a) is slack then λ =0and one obtains
a = c0(s0(a)) as it should be for a free boundary problem. Otherwise, λ>0
and s0(a)=s0(b), i. e. one obtains a ﬁxed boundary problem.
Solving system (18) and returning to variable x(·), one can ﬁnally write
13t h es o l u t i o ni nt h ef o l l o w i n gf o r m :
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
c0(x(b)) = v(b) for α ∈ [b,d]













Note that allocation in (19) is everywhere increasing and therefore, imple-
mentable. In practice, one has ﬁrst to ﬁnd the allocation on the right segment
of the type space, use it to calculate the allocation on the left segment, and
then proceed calculating the surplus in the reverse order. Clearly, the proce-
dure easily generalizes for more than two disconnected segments.
An important feature of the solution is that if the monotonicity constraint
x(b) ≥ x(a) binds the optimal tariﬀ will have a kink at x = x(a)=x(b).T h i s
happens because the ﬁrst order conditions for the consumer problem imply
that both types a and b belong to the subdiﬀerential of the convex function
t(·) at point x.I nf a c t∂t(x)=[ a,b],w h e r e∂ s t a n d sf o rt h es u b d i ﬀerential.
Let us analyze the second equation in the system (19) at point α = a.A t
14that point it implies:
c
0(x(a)) = max(0,a+m i n ( 0 ,c
0(x(b)) − a). (20)
Note that the ﬁrst equation in the system (19) implies c0(x(b)) <b .T h e r e f o r e ,
for a suﬃciently close to b
min(0,c
0(x(b)) − a)=c
0(x(b)) − a, (21)
which implies
x(a)=x(b). (22)
The latter implies that the product line is connected. To generate a gap b
should satisfy:
v(b) ≥ a.( 2 3 )
For example, if the distribution of types is uniform this condition would
imply:
b − a ≥ d − b, (24)
i. e .the length of the right segment should exceed the size of the gap in the
15type space.
3 Some numerical examples
In this section I am going to consider two numerical examples of the
screening model with a disconnected type space. In the ﬁrst example the
resulting product line will contain a gap, while in the second one it will be
connected.











2, for α ∈ [0,1] ∪ [3,4]
0, otherwise
(26)
16with a corresponding c.d.f.
F(α)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
0, for α ≤ 0
α
2, for α ∈ (0,1]
1
2, for α ∈ (1,3]
α−2
2 , for α ∈ (3,4]
1, for α>4.
. (27)
According to our procedure, let us ﬁrst calculate the allocation at segment
[3,4]. In this region
v(α)=2 α − 4, (28)
therefore
x(α)=v(α)=2 α − 4. (29)
Note that
x(3) = 2 >x
eff(1) = 1, (30)
therefore the monotonicity constraint is not binding and on [0,1] the optimal
allocation is given by:
x(α)=m a x ( 0 ,e v(α)), (31)
17where e v(α), deﬁned by (5) can be shown to be:
e v(α)=2 α − 1. (32)
Therefore,
x(α)=m a x ( 2 α − 1,0). (33)
The exclusion region is now given by:




The surplus function on [0,1] can be found by integrating (11) subject to
s(0) = 0.T od ot h i s ,ﬁrst note that (11) and (33) imply that s(·) is constant
on [0,1/2], therefore s(1/2) = 0 and
s(α)=m a x ( α




for α ∈ [0,1]. Surplus on the set [3, 4] is given by:
s(α)=α
2 − 4α + C, (36)
18where constant C can be found from the condition that the type α =3is
indiﬀerent between her contract and that of the type 1, i. e.














max(α2 − α + 1
4,0), for α ∈ [0,1]
α2 − 4α + 21
4 , for α ∈ [3,4]
. (39)
The optimal tariﬀ can be now found as:
t(x)=m a x ( αx − s(α)) (40)






4 , for x ≤ 1
x2+8x−5
4 , for x ≥ 2
. (41)
The optimal product line is [0,1] ∪ [2,4].











2, for α ∈ [0,1] ∪ [3/2,5/2]
0, otherwise
(43)
with a corresponding c.d.f.
F(α)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
0, for α ≤ 0
α
2, for α ∈ (0,1]
1
2, for α ∈ (1, 3
2]
2α−1





According to our procedure, let us ﬁrst calculate the allocation on segment


















eff(1) = 1, (47)
therefore the monotonicity constraint is binding and on [0,1] the optimal
allocation is given by:




where e v(α), deﬁned by (5) can be shown to be:
e v(α)=2 α − 1. (49)
Therefore,




The exclusion region is now given by:




21Note that the allocation on [0,1] in this example is below that in the
previous one and the exclusion region is bigger. I. e. the presence of the group
of consumers with slightly higher marginal rates of substitution between the
quality and money depresses the market for the consumers located on [0,1],
while the presence of consumers with signiﬁcantly higher marginal rates of
substitution has no eﬀect.
The surplus function on [0,1] can be found by integrating (11) subject to
s(0) = 0.T od ot h i s ,ﬁrst note that (11) and (33) imply that s(·) is constant
on [0,3/4], therefore s(3/4) = 0 and













α + C, (53)
where constant C can be found from the condition that the type α =3 /2 is







x(1) − t(1) =
1
2
















16,0), for α ∈ [0,1]
α2 − 5
2α + 29




The optimal tariﬀ can be now found as:
t(x)=m a x ( αx − s(α)) (57)






4 , for x ≤ 1
2
x2+5x−1
4 , for x>1
2
. (58)
Note that, in agreement with the general observation made in the previ-
ous section, the tariﬀ has a kink at x =1 /2. The optimal product line is
connected and given by the segment [0,5/2].
234 The inverse screening problem
Suppose an economist observes the tariﬀ and the product line, i. e. the
set of qualities oﬀered on the market. She is reasonably well informed about
the production process, i. e. is able to come up with a reasonable estimate of
t h ec o s tf u n c t i o n .S h ea l s ok n o w st h es t r u c t u r eo ft h ec o n s u m e r s ’p r e f e r e n c e s ,
i. e. she knows that the utility has form (1). The inverse screening problem
is to come up with a type distribution that justiﬁes the observed tariﬀ and
product line.
Knowing type distribution may be important, especially for the policy
makers, since it determines the size of eﬃciency losses due to the private
information on the side of the consumers. If the right tail of the distribution
is thick then the eﬃciency loss is relatively small. On the other hand, if
the left tail of distribution is thick the eﬃciency losses are large and the
government might consider buying the business from the monopolist and
pricing the goods of diﬀerent qualities at the production cost. It turns out,
however, that the inverse screening problem may be ill deﬁned, i. e. the
solution to it is in general not unique.











4 , for x ≤ 1
2
x2+5x−1
4 , for x>1
2
. (60)
This is, of course, exactly the product line and the tariﬀ found in the pre-
vious section. Therefore, it can be rationalized assuming that the types are
distributed uniformly on [0,1] ∪ [3/2,5/2].T h es a m et a r i ﬀ and product line
could, however, be rationalized by assuming that
F(α)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
0, for α ≤ 0
2α
3 , for α ∈ (0,1]
6α−4
3(2α−1), for α ∈ (1, 3
2]
2α+7





Note that this distribution does not have gaps and the optimal allocation has
25ab u n c hx =1 /2 for types [1,3/2].F o rt h i sd i s t r i b u t i o n2/3 of the total mass
is concentrated at segment [0,1] against only 1/2 for the original distribution.
Moreover, here 1/2 of the consumers are not served in equilibrium against
3/8 before. Though (61) is not the only distribution with a connected type
space that rationalizes tariﬀ (60), all such distributions will have 2/3 of their
mass on [0,1]. This is because if the type space is connected
v(α)=c
0(x(α)) = x(α) (62)
over set of types for which the equilibrium is separating. Solving the con-





for α<1. Using (2) one obtains the following diﬀerential equation for F(·):
α −
1 − F









for α ∈ (0,1].
To understand the reason for non-identiﬁability of the distribution of
types let us ﬁrst start with a consumer problem:
max(αx − t(x)), (66)
where t(·) is given by (60). The ﬁrst order condition is:
α ∈ ∂t(x), (67)
where ∂t(·) denotes the subdiﬀerential of the convex function t(·).C a l c u l a t -
ing the subdiﬀerential and inverting the relationship one obtains:
x(α)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
2α − 3
2, for α ∈ (0,1]
1
2, for α ∈ (1, 3
2]
2α − 5




27There are two sources of non-identiﬁability. First, though x(α) is continuous
it is not invertible. Therefore, though the product line is connected, one can-
not conclude that the type space is. In fact, as we saw above, this allocation
can be produced with a disconnected product line. Second, even if we are
willing to assume that the product line is connected, we cannot say whether
bunching already occurs in the relaxed problem (as it will be for distribution
(61)) or is a result of the ironing procedure applied to the non-monotone
solution of the relaxed problem. From the point of view of estimating the
eﬃciency loss, the ﬁrst problem is probably more serious, since c.d.f.s of all
the distributions with the connected type space coincide on [0,1] and attach
bigger mass to the left tail than those with a disconnected type space. There-
fore, assuming connected type space may lead to a signiﬁcant overestimation
of eﬃciency losses.
Note that non-invertability of x(·) is due to non-diﬀerentiability of t(·),
i. e. to the fact that ∂t(x) fails to be a singleton. If, on the contrary,
t(·) is diﬀerentiable than the ﬁrst order conditions for the consumer problem
can be inverted for all x>0. Therefore, one can determine the set of
types that are served at equilibrium and use Euler-Lagrange equations to
calculate the probability density function over this set. Though one still
28cannot determine uniquely the distribution of types over the exclusion region,
it does not aﬀect any variables of economic interest. Therefore, in that case
the inverse screening problem is well-deﬁned.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper I considered a monopolistic screening model with continuum
of types when the type set is a disconnected subset of real line. I proved
that the product line remains connected provided that the gap in the type
space is suﬃciently small. I also use the results to show that the inverse
screening problem may be ill-deﬁned. If the tariﬀ has a kink then not only
the distribution of types cannot be found but even the type space cannot
be determined. Assuming that the types space connected, while in fact it
is not, can lead to a signiﬁcant overestimation of the welfare losses due to
p r i v a t ei n f o r m a t i o no nt h es i d eo fc o n s u m e r s .T h e r e f o r e ,i ft h ek n o w l e d g eo f
distribution of the consumer tastes is important for policy design, one could
not rely on the observable market information and has to conduct additional
surveys.
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